with D satisfying triangle inequality, the problem of testing whether Core(G) is empty or not is NP-hard. We prove that this conjecture is true. This result directly implies the NP-hardness for the general case when D is asymmetric. We also study approximately fair cost allocations for these games. For this, we introduce the cycle cover games and show that the core of a cycle cover game is non-empty by finding a fair cost allocation vector in polynomial time. For a traveling salesman game, let -Core(G) = {x ∈ |N | : x(N) ≥ c D (N ) and ∀S ⊆ N, x(S) ≤ · c D (S)} be an -approximate core, for a given > 1. By viewing an approximate fair cost allocation vector for this game as a sum of exact fair cost allocation vectors of several related cycle cover games, we provide a polynomial time algorithm demonstrating the non-emptiness of the log 2 (|N| − 1)-approximate core by exhibiting a vector in this approximate core for the asymmetric traveling salesman game. We improve it further by finding a ( polynomial time for some constant c. We also show that there exists an 0 > 1 such that it is NP-hard to decide whether 0 -Core(G) is empty or not.
polynomial time for some constant c. We also show that there exists an 0 > 1 such that it is NP-hard to decide whether 0 -Core(G) is empty or not.
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Introduction
A cooperative game is characterized by a set of players (or agents) and a cost function that is defined for any coalition of these players. The cooperative game related with the traveling salesman problem is very well studied. In a traveling salesman game, the players are the cities which a salesman has to visit. The cost function is intuitively the cost incurred by visiting a given subset of the cities and returning to the home city.
Several problems can be posed with respect to a given combinatorial optimization game. One prominent question is to test the non-emptiness of the core of a game. Probably [18] is the first paper that studied a cooperative game, namely, the assignment game. The underlying combinatorial optimization problem is the assignment problem (or equivalently, the maximum weighted matching problem on bipartite graphs). Testing the core non-emptiness of this game is essentially the same as the polynomial solvability of the optimization problem by the Hungarian method [13] . Another example is the minimum spanning tree game where the core was shown to be non-empty by an explicit construction of a vector in the core [2, 9, 14] . In these examples and some more, a clear relationship exists between the polynomial solvability of the underlying optimization problem and testing the non-emptiness of the core of the game.
Another characterization of the core non-emptiness of a game is from linear programming. A result of Deng et al. [3] states that a necessary and sufficient condition for the core of a maximum packing game and a minimum covering game to be non-empty is that the linear programming relaxations of these problems have integral optimal solutions. Note that the underlying optimization problems in this case are NPhard. Other characterizations in this direction are for the facility location games [12] , partition games [5] , and delivery games [10] to mention a few.
On the other hand, several papers deal with the intractability of the core nonemptiness of certain games. For example, Deng et al. [3] , showed that testing the nonemptiness of the core of the minimum coloring game is NP-complete. The underlying combinatorial optimization problem in the case is also NP-hard. Thus, this reinstates again the relationship between these two problems. Goemans and Skutella [8] showed the NP-completeness of the core non-emptiness of a facility location game.
In this paper, we study traveling salesman games, introduced by Potters et al. [17] . More formally, a cooperative game is given by the tuple (N, f ), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and f : 2 N → is a characteristic function. In the case of a traveling salesman game, N = {1, 2, . . . , n} (the cities) with a given symmetric distance matrix D (referred to as a cost function defined on all pairs of cities) on the set of cities and for a subset S ⊆ N , we have the characteristic function c D (S) defined to be the cost of a minimum cost Hamiltonian tour which visits all the cities in S ∪ {0} where 0 ∈ N is called the home city or home node. Note that the cost matrix D is defined over all pairs (i, j ) where i, j ∈ N ∪ {0}. The core of a game (N, f ) is defined to be the following:
..,n . The interpretation of this definition for the traveling salesman game can be motivated as follows. Consider home node 0 as the home city of a professor who has to give talks at the universities located in vertices 1, . . . , n. The total travel cost is c D (N ) . So, the problem is to find a fair cost allocation (a vector in the core) such that no coalition S will split off because they pay more than the actual cost of an optimal subtour through S ∪ {0} and invite the professor to visit only the universities i ∈ S. Various aspects of traveling salesman games have already been covered in the literature. Tamir [19] showed that a metric (i.e., satisfying triangle inequality) traveling salesman game with at most four players always has a non-empty core and also the existence of a game with six players whose core is empty. Furthermore, Faigle et al. [6] designed an instance of a 2-dimensional Euclidean game with six players such that the core is empty. More recently, Okamoto [15] showed that the problem of deciding whether a general traveling salesman game has an empty core or not, is NP-hard. But for the special case of metric traveling salesman games, the same question was left open and conjectured to be NP-hard. In this paper, we show that this is indeed the case. In fact, we prove that testing the core-emptiness of a {1, 2} traveling salesman game where the costs on any pair of cities is either one or two and the costs are symmetric (i.e., cost on a pair (i, j ) is the same as that on (j, i)) is NP-hard. This also proves that it is NP-hard to decide if the core of an asymmetric traveling salesman game with triangle inequality is empty or not. Note that an asymmetric traveling salesman game is a generalization of the symmetric game.
We then consider approximately fair cost allocations, i.e., find a cost allocation vector x ∈ |N | such that ∀S ⊆ N , x(S) ≤ · c D (S) and x(N) ≥ c D (N ), for some > 1. Our reduction also shows that it is NP-hard to find an 0 -approximate cost allocation vector for some 0 > 1 for the (a)symmetric traveling salesman game, using a result of Berman et al. [1] .
We introduce cycle cover games on the same underlying complete directed graph, where the characteristic function is the cost of a minimum cost cycle cover. Note that a cycle cover game on a complete directed graph is equivalent to an assignment game on a bipartite graph (complete bipartite except for a perfect matching). We show that the core is always non-empty for such a game and provide a O(|N| 3 ) time algorithm for finding a fair cost allocation vector. This follows easily from known results on assignment games, but we present a proof, too, since we need the notations. We also show that an approximately fair cost allocation vector for an asymmetric traveling salesman game is the sum of exact fair cost allocation vectors of several related cycle cover games.
The question of finding an approximately fair cost allocation vector has already been considered for several cooperative games where testing the core non-emptiness problem is NP-hard. Faigle et al. [6] find a 1.5-approximately fair cost allocation vector for symmetric traveling salesman game. For this, they make use of Christofides' well-known approximation algorithm for the symmetric traveling salesman optimization problem. In this paper, we provide a polynomial time algorithm that finds a log 2 (|N| − 1)-approximate cost allocation vector for the asymmetric traveling salesman game. We make use of an approximation algorithm for the minimum asymmetric traveling salesman problem (Min ATSP) of Frieze et al. [7] . By adapting a polynomial time 4 3 log 3 (n)-approximation algorithm for Min ATSP by Kaplan et al. [11] , we find a ( We denote the problem as Core-TS or the problem of testing the core nonemptiness of a metric traveling salesman game. A special case of this problem is Core-(1, 2)-TS where the costs on the edges are either one or two. We show that Core-TS is NP-hard by a polynomial time reduction from the following SAT problem (3SAT4) to Core-(1, 2)-TS. 3SAT4 is also called the Bounded Occurrence Satisfiability problem:
Preliminaries
Given a boolean formula φ as a conjunction of disjunctive clauses with exactly three literals per clause and the number of occurrences of a literal is four, does there exist a truth assignment to the variables of the formula such that all the clauses are satisfied?
3SAT4 was shown to be NP-complete in [20] . Recently, it was shown in [1] , that it is NP-hard to approximate the corresponding maximization problem to within a constant c > 1.
Papadimitriou-Yannakakis' Construction
STSP(1, 2) is the following minimization problem: given a complete graph on nodes N where the costs on the edges are either one or two, find a minimum cost Hamiltonian tour in the graph. We describe the construction of Papadimitrou and Yannakakis [16] to prove the SNP-hardness of STSP(1, 2) from 3SAT4. In the subsequent section, we elaborate our polynomial time reduction from 3SAT4 to Core-(1, 2)-TS, and highlight the differences in both the constructions.
The Basic Gadgets
The usual reductions to the traveling salesman problem make use of special components called gadgets or devices. A gadget forces an optimal Hamiltonian tour to have a special structure.
A basic gadget used in the construction is the ex-OR device, shown in Fig. 1a . All the edges in this device are of cost one. The structure of the device is so that there can be only two possible traversals of this gadget by any optimum Hamiltonian tour which uses only cost one edges since the gadget is connected to the rest of the graph only at the boundary vertices. We shall think of an ex-OR subgraph as two edges connected by an extrinsic device (Fig. 1b ). This will be useful in visualizing the Hamiltonian cycle in the whole graph.
For each variable of the boolean formula, we have a device as shown in Fig. 2 . It has two paths, one for each truth value of the variable. We refer to these paths as "true path" and "false path" respectively. Each path is an arrangement of 29 ex-ORs-four There are four "occurence" edges corresponding to the four occurrences of literal x orx, in the respective paths Fig. 3 The clause gadget. There are three ex-OR devices corresponding to the three literals of the clause Fig. 4 The graph H . Corners of clause gadgets, and the nodes s and t ' form a complete subgraph of H of them are connected to the clause devices (one for each occurrence of a literal called occurrence edge), and the others (five "batteries" or "series" of five ex-ORs each) are connected within to the other path of the same variable device. The intuition behind such a construction is consistency, i.e., to ensure that an optimal tour does not traverse both paths. So, any optimal Hamiltonian tour traverses exactly one of the two paths and also all the vertices of this path appear successively on the tour.
For each clause, we have a triangle device with each edge connected to the occurrence edge of the literal in the clause via an ex-OR device. Please refer to Fig. 3 .
The Construction
We now describe the actual graph that will be constructed from a given boolean formula. Let φ = C 1 ∧ C 2 ∧ · · · ∧ C m be the given boolean formula where each
. Also any variable v appears four times as the literal v and four times as the literalv in φ. We construct graph the H as follows. Fix an order of the variables and connect the variable gadgets as a series, as shown in Fig. 4 . The set of all m clause gadgets are connected so that the 3m corners are pairwise connected amongst themselves and also to the first and last vertices of the variable series.
The distance matrix D for this graph H is simply:
This means that all the edges which are mentioned in the construction are of cost one and the remaining edges (note that an instance of a TSP game is a complete graph) are of cost two.
Structural Lemmas
Definition 1 Nodes of G that are traversed by an optimal Hamiltonian tour with one edge of cost one and another of cost two are called endpoints. Those nodes that are traversed with both edges of cost two are called double endpoints and will be seen as two endpoints each.
The following two lemmata are shown by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis. 
Lemma 1 Let

Our Construction
Our reduction differs from that of Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [16] in that we reduce to Core-(1, 2)-TS instead of STSP (1, 2) . But since the former problem differs only slightly from the latter in structure, we make use of the basic gadgets and the structural lemmas from the previous section.
Our clause gadget is shown in Fig. 5 . Note that we have extra nodes as corners and that there are nine edges between the boundary points of adjacent ex-OR devices of the gadget. These edges will be referred to as boundary-boundary edges. (The gadget differs from the one presented in the conference version, the six newedges are needed in the proof of Lemma 3.) This is an important difference from the clause gadget of [16] , which will be essential for the NP-hardness proof. The instance graph G of Core-(1, 2)-TS is illustrated in Fig. 6 . The modifications are necessitated because of Fig. 6 The graph G. Home node "0" is not considered to be part of G. Corners of clause gadgets, the nodes s and t and "0" form a complete subgraph of G ∪ {0} Fig. 7 The traversal of a clause gadget that corresponds to a clause satisfied by one, two, or three literals, respectively the inclusion of the home node "0". Note that in the construction, we only show cost one edges. It is assumed that the remaining edges of the complete graph on N ∪ {0} are of cost two.
Structure of an Optimal Tour
We show the following lemmas on the structure of optimal Hamiltonian tours in G. Proof Consider the following tour. The variable part of G is traversed according to the assignment A, i.e., if a i = 1 in A, then we take the "true path" of the variable a i , otherwise the "false path" of the variable. In the clause part, the tour traverses the satisfied clause gadgets first. (At most two edges of such a triangle are not covered by the variable part traversal of the tour). Figure 7 shows how the tour runs through the gadget if one, two, or three clauses are satisfied. Then, in the unsatisfied clause 
Lemma 3 Let
is optimal. The proof of this fact is essentially the same as given in [16] which exhaustively lists the various possibilities of traversal and in each case how one can modify the tour to have the required structure without increasing costs. The clause gadget of [16] and ours differ in the introduction of new corner vertices additional cost one edges between the boundary points in our construction (the boundaryboundary edges). But externally it behaves like the gadget in [16] , since we can enter it only through the corner vertices and the ex-OR-gadgets by cost one edges, so the arguments are valid here, too.
The optimal tours in our construction can enter a clause gadget several times via the corner vertices. We can modify the traversal of any optimal Hamiltonian tour through our clause gadget such that every gadget is only entered once via the corner vertices. This modification is illustrated in Fig. 8 . In Fig. 8a , the optimal tour uses the boundary edge (b 1 , b 2 ). This can be overcome by the modification suggested in (b). Since for optimality, any clause gadget can be entered only from corner vertices, the vertices c 1 , c 2 are indeed corner vertices and hence are connected by an edge of cost one. Putting it all together, the lemma follows.
Lemma 4 Let n be the number of vertices in G. If φ is satisfiable, the cost of an optimal Hamiltonian tour in G is n. If φ is unsatisfiable and there exists an optimal (in the sense of satisfying maximum number of clauses) assignment with k unsatisfied clauses, then the cost of an optimal Hamiltonian tour in
Proof Consider the optimal Hamiltonian tour constructed in Lemma 3. If φ is satisfiable or in other words k = 0, then this tour has no endpoints. So, its cost is n. Otherwise, the tour has k or k + 1 endpoints. Each endpoint has one edge of cost two in the tour, and hence the number of cost two edges in the tour is k 2 or k+1 2 when k is even or odd respectively, i.e., k 2 cost two edges. Thus, the cost of the tour is
Hardness Results
Let n be the number of vertices in G. Define N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, the vertices of G. Also, let c D : 2 N → , be defined as follows. For any S ⊆ N , c D (S) is the cost of a minimum cost tour through the vertices of S ∪ {0}. Recall that in our construction, the home node 0 is connected to the corner vertices of all clause gadgets by cost one edges. N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and D is a (n + 1) × (n + 1) Proof We show the NP-hardness of Core-TS by showing the following equivalent claim.
Theorem 1 If
Claim Let φ be the boolean formula instance of 3SAT4 given as a conjunction of clauses. Then, φ is satisfiable if and only if Core(N, c D ) is non-empty.
Suppose φ is satisfiable. We show a fair cost allocation in the TSP game (N, c D ) thereby proving the core to be non-empty. Since φ is satisfiable, by Lemma 4, the cost of an optimal Hamiltonian tour is n + 1. Note that this tour passes through the home node '0'. Let us define the vector x ∈ n to be ( 
(S).
Hence, x ∈Core (N, c D ) . Now, suppose φ is unsatisfiable. Consider an optimal truth assignment A (optimal in terms of maximum number of satisfiable clauses) which satisfies all but k clauses (k > 2). We deal with k = 1, 2 cases later. Depending on the truth value of a variable in A, let T denote all the vertices of G occurring in the "true paths" of all variables (i.e., if variable v i = 1 in A, then we take the path in the variable device of v i corresponding to the literal v i , otherwise that ofv i ), the vertices of all the ex-OR batteries on the "false paths" and finally all the remaining vertices of satisfied clause devices (with respect to A). This means that we consider all the vertices in the variable part of G except those present in the occurrence edges on the "false paths" with respect to A. It also implies that vertices of ex-OR devices of occurrence edges in "true paths" present on the satisfied clauses (with respect to A) are also in T . Let C denote the corner vertices of the unsatisfied clause gadgets. Let R := N\{T ∪ C}. Suppose, for contradiction, that Core(N, c D ) = ∅. Let x ∈ Core (N, c D ) . Since x ∈ n is a fair cost allocation vector, the following structural properties must hold for x.
Observation 1 If x is a fair cost allocation vector, and T is defined as above, then x(T ) ≤ |T | + 1.
Proof There is a Hamiltonian tour through the vertices of T which uses only cost one edges, as follows. First, traverse the vertices of T on the variable part of G according to the assignment A. Now, consider the vertices of satisfied clause devices that have not yet been covered by the tour. There are three possibilities: Fig. 9 a, b, c show the traversals of three tours H 1 , H 2 , H 3 respectively on an unsatisfied clause gadget. In We consider three tours H 1 , H 2 , H 3 through the vertices of C ∪ R as shown in Fig. 9 . Let an unsatisfied clause gadget C i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, be given by − 2) ), where the first three are the corner vertices and R(p, q) denotes the vertices in the ex-OR gadget between (p, q) of C i and the corresponding occurrence edge in the variable part of G. Thus, the tour H 1 is then {2, R(1, 2), R(3, 1), 3, 5, R(5, 4), R(6, 4), 6, . . . , 3k − 1, R(3k − 2, 3k − 1), R(3k, 3k − 2), 3k, 2}. The tours H 2 and H 3 are similarly defined. Let H be one of these tours with the maximum x(.) value, i.e., x(H ) : We employ the following technique in order to overcome the difficulty in getting a contradiction for k ≤ 2. Instead of considering the formula φ, we look at the formula φ = φ 1 ∧ φ 2 ∧ φ 3 . The formula φ is a conjunction of the formulas φ i , for i = 1, 2, 3, where each φ i is a copy of the old formula φ but with new, distinct variables. This means that φ has 3n variables and 3m clauses. It is easy to see that both φ and φ are equivalent because the variables of each φ i are distinct. Now, if there is an optimal truth assignment that satisfies all but k clauses of φ, then there is an optimal truth assignment that satisfies all but 3k clauses of φ . Thus, when k = 1 or k = 2, the number of unsatisfied clauses in φ is respectively 3 and 6. The above proof holds good for φ . Hence, Core(N, c D ) = ∅. This proves the claim that φ is satisfiable if and only if Core (N, c D ) is non-empty. Clearly, the construction of the graph G from φ can be done in polynomial time (in the size of φ and the number of variables). Therefore, Core-TS is NP-hard. Proof Let the problem mentioned in the statement of the theorem be referred to as Core-ATS. But since Core-TS is shown to be NP-hard by Theorem 1, and it is a special case of Core-ATS, the claim of the theorem follows.
Approximately Fair Cost Allocation
Since the core emptiness problem is NP-hard for traveling salesman games, we turn our attention towards finding approximately fair cost allocation vectors. Define, for a (N, f ) game and a given > 1, the -approximate core as:
Towards finding such approximately fair cost allocations, we introduce new games called cycle cover games.
Cycle Cover Games
Let G = (V , E) be a complete directed graph with a cost function D : E → . A cycle cover C in G is a collection of vertex-disjoint cycles that span V . A minimum cost cycle cover is a cycle cover of minimum cost with respect to D. We define a cycle cover game to be the tuple (N, f D ) where N = V , and f D : 2 V → is defined for a subset S ⊆ N as the cost of a minimum cost cycle cover on the vertices of S. For this game, we show that the core is non-empty by finding a fair cost allocation vector in polynomial time.
Theorem 3 For a cycle cover game (N, f D ), the core is not empty. A fair cost allocation vector in the core can be found in O(|N| 3 ) time.
Proof Consider the following integer program formulation for the minimum cost cycle cover problem:
where y ij ∈ {0, 1}.
We relax the final set of constraints to y ij ≥ 0, to obtain a linear program L(N ). It is known that in fact L(N ) has an integer optimum solution. Next, we consider the dual program of L(N ).
Let us denote the dual program by D(N ). Let x(v)
is a fair cost allocation vector to the cycle cover game (N, f D ) . By the duality theorem, we know that the optimal value of the objective function of L(N ) which is f D (N ) by definition, is the same as x(N ). Consider any subset S ⊂ N . Let C S denote a minimum cost cycle cover on S, i.e., the cost of this cycle cover is
Here, C ∈ C S denotes a cycle in the cycle cover and the inequality in the middle follows because of the feasibility of x in D(N ). Thus, we have shown that x ∈ |N | is a fair cost allocation vector of the cycle cover game (N, f D ) , thereby showing the non-emptiness of the core. Also x is computed in O(|N| 3 ) time using the algorithm of [4] which is a primal-dual type algorithm.
A Traveling Salesman Game as a Combination of Several Cycle Cover Games
We show how one can view a traveling salesman game to be a combination of several cycle cover games. Formally, what we prove is that a certain approximately fair cost allocation vector for a traveling salesman game can be seen as the sum of (exact) fair cost allocation vectors of several related cycle cover games. We provide an algorithm to find such an approximately fair cost allocation vector, followed by the proof of the claimed degree of approximation.
Here, the traveling salesman game refers to the asymmetric traveling salesman game where the cost matrix fulfills the triangle inequality. For the purpose of proving the main theorem of this section, we adapt the approximation algorithm of Frieze et al. [7] , for the asymmetric traveling salesman optimization problem. This approximation algorithm achieves a performance guarantee of log 2 (|V |), where V is the set of vertices of the underlying complete directed graph. 
9: j := j + 1.
10: Pick exactly one vertex from each of the cycles of the cycle cover C. Set V j to be the set of such vertices.
11: end while
12: return the vector x * .
The algorithm to find an approximately fair cost allocation vector for an asymmetric traveling salesman game is given in Algorithm 1. Note that the home node "0" is included only in the first cycle cover game. This program is the asymmetric version of the program for symmetric game given in [6] . It can be easily verified that the actual integer linear program corresponding to T (N ) has an optimum value c D (N ). When the subtour elimination constraints are dropped from T (N ), the linear program obtained is the same as the linear program L(N ∪ {0}) formulated in the proof of Theorem 3. This can be seen as follows: the only issue is to verify that not having the in-degree and out-degree constraints at home node "0" is equivalent to having the constraints. Suppose "0" appears in more than one cycle of an optimal solution y (we can assume that y is integral). Let u, v ∈ N be such that y u0 = 1 = y 0v where u, v are in the same cycle in this cycle cover y. Then by changing y uv from 0 to 1 and resetting y u0 , y 0v both to 0, we obtain a solution of cost at most that of y as d u0 + d 0v ≥ d uv by triangle inequality.
From the algorithm,
where k is such that |V k | = 1, i.e. the number of times the while-loop gets executed. By duality theorem, this means that x * (N ) is the sum of the costs of all k cycle covers computed in the algorithm. Now, the union of all these cycle covers is an Eulerian graph (the in-degree of any vertex is equal to its out-degree). But, any Hamiltonian tour obtained by short-cutting through such an Eulerian graph is of cost at most that of the whole Eulerian graph because of triangle inequality. Hence,
is the cost of an optimal Hamiltonian tour.
Consider any subset R ⊂ N . We claim that
. Now, since x 0 ∈ |N |+1 (refer to step 2 of the algorithm) is an exact fair cost allocation vector for the cycle cover game on N ∪ {0}, we have x 0 (R ∪ {0}) is at most the cost of a minimum cost cycle cover on R ∪ {0}. But, by definition,
is at most the cost of a minimum cost cycle cover on R ∪ {0} which is at most c D (R), the cost of an optimal Hamiltonian tour through R ∪ {0}. Next, we show that for all 0 < j ≤ k, x j (R ∩ V j ) ≤ c D (R). Denote by TSP j , the optimal value of the linear program T (V j ∩ R). Then, since any feasible solution to T (V j ∩ R) is a cycle cover on V j ∩ R, we have that
The only non-zero TSP j values are those for which |V j ∩ R| = 0. By triangle inequality, we have that for all j , TSP j ≤ TSP 0 where TSP 0 is the cost of an optimal solution to the LP, T (N ∩ R). As shown before,
The last inequality is true because the linear program optimal value is a lower bound on the integer optimal value. Since, R ⊂ N , |R| ≤ |N| − 1. So, for any R ⊂ N , we have x * (R) ≤ log 2 (|N| − 1)c D (R).
From the above two paragraphs, we deduce that x * ∈ |N | is a log 2 (|N| − 1)-approximately fair cost allocation vector for the asymmetric traveling salesman game (N, c D ) .
As for the running time of the algorithm, to find a minimum cost cycle cover there is O(|N| 3 ) algorithm due to [4] . Also, as mentioned in Theorem 3, finding a fair cost allocation vector for a cycle cover game takes O (|N | 3 ) 
Improved Approximately Fair Cost Allocation
In this section, we try to adapt the 4 3 log 3 (n)-approximation algorithm for the minimum asymmetric traveling salesman problem of Kaplan et al. [11] to find a better approximately fair cost allocation for the asymmetric traveling salesman game.
Lemma 5 [11] Let G = (V , E) be a complete directed graph with a cost matrix D satisfying triangle inequality. There exists a 2-regular directed graph C (obtained in polynomial time in G) such that C is the union of two directed cycle covers C 1 , C 2 where the cost of C is at most 2 · OPT, OPT is the cost of an optimal Hamiltonian tour and C 1 , C 2 do not share a 2-cycle.
We adapt the above lemma to a statement concerning vectors of cycle covers. 
These vectors can be found in polynomial time.
Proof Follows directly from Lemma 5.
We introduce some notation for understanding the algorithm that finds an improved approximately fair cost allocation vector for the asymmetric traveling salesman game. We assume that we are given a directed graph G = (V , E) with a cost matrix D. Proof We need to show that x * satisfies the following two properties:
